As the bankers' bonus season arrives and the world's media ogle the figures, something seems to have gone missing in the debate. One of the recommendations urged by regulators on both sides of the Atlantic, backed up with the threat of further intervention if ignored, was to change the way in which bonuses are paid, rather than the size of them.
Eurosceptics, many of them in the UK, have so far rejoiced at the crisis in the eurozone, believing it has proven that they were right all along – a monetary union without fiscal union makes economic nonsense. The crisis, say the eurosceptics, exposes the euro as a largely political project.
Every analyst has their own spin on what the impact of Basel III might be, and Bernard de Longevialle’s financial institutions team at credit ratings agency Standard & Poor’s has now added its own 16-page report. One of the most striking observations is the effect that tougher risk-weights on banks’ assets could have on certain banks that had recorded relatively healthy capital adequacy ratios under Basel II.
Anyone that hoped the financial crisis would be the catalyst for substantial change to Germany's three-pillar banking system may be disappointed. The rigid structure that divides the German banking sector into privately owned banks, publicly owned banks and co-operatives seems even now resistant to change.
One veteran emerging-market investor is fond of saying that emerging markets are the ones where risk is priced in and developed markets are the ones where risk is overlooked. For many years, he and others like him were lonely voices. But today it seems the whole market agrees, which is a sure sign of trouble brewing.